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Abstract 
An individual makes random errors when evaluating the expected utility of a risky lottery. Errors 
are symmetrically distributed around zero as long as an individual does not make transparent 
mistakes such as choosing a risky lottery over its highest possible outcome for certain. This 
stochastic decision theory explains many well-known violations of expected utility theory such 
as the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes, the discrepancy between certainty equivalent and 
probability equivalent elicitation methods, the preference reversal phenomenon, the generalized 
common consequence effect (the Allais paradox), the common ratio effect and the violations of 
the betweenness. 
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Stochastic choice under risk 
I. Introduction 
Experimental studies of repeated choice under risk (e.g. Knight, 1921) demonstrate that 
individual decision making is a stochastic rather than deterministic process. Camerer (1989), 
Starmer and Sugden (1989) and Wu (1994) provide extensive experimental evidence that there is 
some degree of randomness in the observed choices between risky lotteries. When individuals 
choose repeatedly between the same lotteries (with a possibility to declare indifference), they 
make identical decisions only in around 75% of all cases (e.g. Hey and Orme, 1994, p.1296). 
Apparently, decision making under risk is inherently stochastic (e.g. Ballinger and Wilcox, 
1997). Moreover, Hey (2001) finds the variability of the subjects’ responses to be generally 
higher than the difference in the predictive error of various deterministic decision theories. 
While stochastic nature of choice under risk is persistently documented in experimental 
data, it remains largely ignored in the majority of decision theories (e.g. Loomes and Sugden, 
1998). As a notable exception, Machina (1985) and Chew et al. (1991) develop a model of 
stochastic choice as a result of deliberate randomization by individuals with quasi-concave 
preferences (e.g. Starmer 2000). However, Hey and Carbone (1995) find that randomness in the 
observed choices between lotteries cannot be attributed to conscious randomization.  
To reconcile predominantly deterministic decision theories with stochastic empirical 
data, a common approach is to embed a core decision theory into a stochastic choice model, for 
example, when estimating the parameters of a particular decision theory from experimental data. 
The models of stochastic choice employed for this purpose can be classified into three groups 
(e.g. Loomes and Sugden, 1998). The simplest stochastic choice model is proposed by Harless 
and Camerer (1994) who argue that individuals generally choose among lotteries according to 
some deterministic decision theory, but there is a constant probability that this deterministic 
choice pattern reverses (as a result of pure tremble). Carbone (1997) and Loomes et al. (2002) 
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find that this constant error model fails to explain the experimental data and it is essentially 
“inadequate as a general theory of stochastic choice”. 
Hey and Orme (1994) propose a stochastic choice model where a random error distorts 
the net advantage of one lottery over another (in terms of utility) according to some deterministic 
decision theory. Error term is an independently and identically distributed random variable with 
zero mean and constant variance.1 Such random error or Fechner model (e.g. Fechner, 1860) can 
explain several choice anomalies including the common ratio effect (e.g. Loomes, 2005) and the 
violations of the betweenness (e.g. Blavatskyy, 2006). However, Loomes and Sugden (1998) 
find that random error model predicts too many violations of first order stochastic dominance. 
Camerer and Ho (1994) and Wu and Gonzalez (1996) argue that the probability of choosing one 
lottery over another is simply a logit function of the difference in their utilities (according to the 
deterministic underlying theory). Luce and Suppes (1965) prove a theorem that such (strong 
utility) model is in fact equivalent to random error model of Hey and Orme (1994).  
Finally, Loomes and Sugden (1995) argue that individual preferences over lotteries are 
stochastic and can be represented by random utility model. Random utility model can explain a 
preference reversal phenomenon (e.g. Loomes, 2005) but it cannot rationalize rare violations of 
stochastic dominance that are observed in the data (e.g. Loomes and Sugden, 1998). Moreover, 
Sopher and Narramore (2000) find that variation in individual decisions is not systematic in a 
statistical sense, which strongly supports random error rather than random utility model. 
Apparently, different models of stochastic choice that are used for generating stochastic 
choice pattern from a deterministic core decision theory are successful in explaining some choice 
anomalies but none of them is suitable for accommodating all known phenomena. To address 
this problem, I develop a new stochastic decision theory explaining many stylized empirical facts 
                                                 
1 Hey (1995) and Buschena and Zilberman (2000) assume that error term is heteroscedastic i.e. the variance of errors 
is higher in certain decision problems, for example, when lotteries have many possible outcomes. 
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as a consequence of random mistakes that individuals make when evaluating a risky lottery. 
Thus, stochastic component is incorporated as a part of core decision theory, which makes 
explicit predictions about stochastic choice patterns. The latter are directly accessible for 
econometric testing on empirical data (without resorting to auxiliary stochastic choice models). 
The main results of this paper can be summarized as follows. A new stochastic decision 
theory postulates that individuals behave as if maximizing the expected utility of risky lotteries 
but the exact calculation of the expected utility is distorted by random errors. Random errors are 
symmetrically distributed around zero as long as a lottery is valued at least as good as its lowest 
possible outcome and at most as good as its highest possible outcome (internality axiom). Errors 
are heteroskedastic (utility of degenerate lotteries or “sure things” is unaffected by errors) and 
correlated (errors are highly correlated when one lottery transparently dominates the other).  
This stochastic decision theory explains many well-known violations of expected utility 
theory such as the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes, the discrepancy between certainty equivalent 
and probability equivalent elicitation methods, the preference reversal phenomenon, generalized 
common consequence effect (the Allais paradox), the common ratio effect and the violations of 
the betweenness. The reexamination of well-known experimental studies of repeated choice 
under risk reveals that the predictive power of new theory is comparable or even superior to that 
of other prominent descriptive decision theories such as the rank-dependent expected utility 
theory (e.g. Quiggin, 1981) and cumulative prospect theory (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The basic idea of new theory is 
demonstrated in Section II, which considers the simplest possible case of binary choice between 
one risky and one degenerate lottery. This basic theory is extended in Section III to deal with 
binary choice between two risky lotteries. The econometric estimation of new theory is presented 
in Section IV that reexamines three well-known experimental studies. Section V concludes. 
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II. Binary choice between a risky and a degenerate lottery 
Let ( )nn pxpxL ,;..., 11  denote a discrete lottery that delivers a monetary outcome R∈ix  
with probability ip , { }ni ,...,1∈ . Let 1x  be the lowest possible outcome and let nx  be the highest 
possible outcome. An individual has deterministic preferences over lotteries that are represented 
by von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function RR →:u . The latter is defined over changes in 
wealth rather than absolute wealth levels, as first proposed by Markowitz (1952) and advocated 
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). The observed binary choices of an individual are, however, 
stochastic due to random errors that an individual makes when evaluating a risky lottery.  
In particular, an individual chooses a lottery L  over outcome x  for certain if  
(1) ( ) ( )xuLU ≥ ,   
where the perceived expected utility of a lottery ( )LU  is equal to the true expected utility of a 
lottery ( )∑ == ni iiL xupµ  according to individual preferences plus a random error Lξ . An 
individual always chooses lottery L  over outcome x  for certain if condition (1) holds with strict 
inequality. Thus, an individual behaves as if maximizing the perceived expected utility (2). 
(2) ( ) LLLU ξµ += .   
In general, an individual makes mistakes when evaluating a risky lottery, but he or she is 
unlikely to make transparent and obvious errors, which is captured by the following assumption. 
Assumption 1 (internality axiom) An individual always chooses lottery L  over 
outcome x  for certain, if outcome x  is smaller than 1x  and an individual always chooses 
outcome x  for certain over lottery L , if outcome x  is higher than nx . 
Assumption 1 implies that there are no errors in choice under certainty. In other words, if 
choosing between 20 dollars for sure and 10 dollars for sure, a rational individual always chooses 
the higher amount. Assumption 1 also restricts the distribution of random errors that distort the 
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expected utility of risky lotteries. Let [ ]1,0: →RLF  be the cumulative distribution function of 
error Lξ  occurring when an individual calculates the expected utility Lµ  of a risky lottery L . 
Assumption 1 implies that ( )( ) 0=− LL xuF µ  for all 1xx <  and ( )( ) 1=− LL xuF µ  for all nxx > . 
Let LCE  be the certainty equivalent of a risky lottery L  according to the deterministic 
preferences of an individual i.e. ( ) LLCEu µ= . If there were no errors in the evaluation of lottery 
L , an individual would always choose lottery L  over any outcome LCEx <  for certain, would 
always choose any outcome LCEx >  for certain over lottery L  and would be exactly indifferent 
between choosing lottery L  and amount LCE  for certain. When random errors affect choice, an 
individual may choose an outcome LCEx <  for certain over lottery L  and similarly, by mistake, 
he or she may choose lottery L  over amount LCEx >  for certain. Such mistakes can occur as 
long as they do not lead to the violation of Assumption 1. 
Assumption 2 For any amount 0>ε  and a risky lottery L  such that [ ]nL xxCE ,1∈± ε  
the following events are equally likely to occur: 
• lottery L  is chosen over outcome ε−LCE  for certain but not over outcome LCE  for certain 
• lottery L  is chosen over outcome LCE  for certain but not over outcome ε+LCE  for certain. 
The intuition behind Assumption 2 is the following. Consider an ε -neighborhood of the 
true certainty equivalent LCE  that does not contain outcomes, which are transparently inferior or 
superior to L  due to Assumption 1. The perceived certainty equivalent2 of lottery L  is equally 
likely to be below or above LCE  in this ε -neighborhood. Thus, Assumption 2 effectively states 
that small random errors3 are symmetrically distributed around zero on the outcome scale. In 
general, this may not hold for large errors. Assumption 1 prevents an individual from making 
                                                 
2 That is an outcome whose utility is equal to the perceived expected utility (2) of a lottery. 
3 In this context random errors are considered small if ( ) ( ){ }LnLL xuxu µµξ −−≤ ,min 1 . 
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transparent large errors but transparent negative errors ( ) LL xu µξ −≥ 1  and transparent positive 
errors ( ) LnL xu µξ −≥  are not necessarily symmetrically distributed. The remainder of this 
section shows how a simple stochastic theory (1)-(2) together with Assumptions 1-2 explains 
well-known empirical phenomena in binary choice between one risky and one degenerate lottery. 
A. The fourfold pattern of risk attitudes 
The fourfold pattern of risk attitudes refers to an empirical observation that individuals 
often exhibit risk aversion when dealing with probable gains or improbable losses. The same 
individuals often exhibit risk seeking when dealing with improbable gains or probable losses 
(e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). One of the implications of the fourfold pattern of risk 
attitudes is that individuals can simultaneously purchase insurance and public lottery tickets. The 
latter paradoxical observation was the first descriptive challenge for the expected utility theory 
(e.g. Friedman and Savage, 1948). 
Consider a lottery L  whose certainty equivalent LCE  according to undistorted individual 
preferences is closer to the highest possible outcome nx  than to the lowest possible outcome 1x  
i.e. 1xCECEx LLn −<− . Tversky and Kahneman (1992) would refer to such lottery either as a 
probable gain or an improbable loss. Let i
n
i iL
xpEV ∑== 1  be the expected value of lottery L  and 
LM  be an outcome such that an individual is equally likely: 1) to choose L  over LM  for certain, 
2) to choose LM  for certain over L . For lottery L , outcome LM  is smaller or equal to LCE .
4  
                                                 
4 Proof by contradiction. If LL CEM >  then probability that lottery L  is chosen over outcome LM  for certain is ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ≤≤+≤−=≥+>≥+ LLLnLLLLLLL CEuxCEuprobCEuprobMuprob ξµξµξµ 2  ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )LLLLLLLLL MuprobMuxuprobCEuxuprob ≤+=≤+≤<≤+≤≤ ξµξµξµ 11 , 
with the first equality due to Assumption 2, the second equality due to Assumption 1, and 12 xxCE nL >−  due to 
the property of L . Thus, the probability that lottery L  is chosen over outcome LM  for certain is greater than the 
probability that outcome LM  for certain is chosen over lottery L , which contradicts to the definition of LM . 
 8
If an individual has a concave utility function ( ).u  then LLL MCEEV ≥≥ . In binary 
choice between lottery L  and its expected value LEV  for certain, an individual then is more 
likely (or equally likely) to choose  LEV  for certain. This conclusion also holds for an individual 
with a convex utility function if ( )≥LCE LL MEV ≥ . Therefore, for probable gains or improbable 
losses individuals with a concave utility function and some individuals with a convex utility 
function exhibit a risk averse behavior at least as often as a risk seeking behavior. 
Consider now a lottery L  with a certainty equivalent LCE  closer to 1x  than to nx  so that 
1xCECEx LLn −>− . Such lottery would be either an improbable gain or a probable loss in the 
terminology of Tversky and Kahneman (1992). For lottery L  inequality ≥LM LCE  holds (proof 
is identical to the proof in footnote 4 with all inequalities reversed and 1x  and nx  interchanged). 
If an individual has a convex utility function then LLL EVCEM ≥≥ . In binary choice between 
L  and LEV  for certain, such individual is more (or equally) likely to choose L . This also holds 
for individuals with a concave utility function if LL EVM ≥  ( )LCE≥ . Thus, for improbable 
gains or probable losses individuals with a convex utility function and some individuals with a 
concave utility function exhibit a risk seeking behavior at least as often as a risk averse behavior. 
To summarize, the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes has a very intuitive explanation. By 
construction, probable gains and improbable losses are lotteries whose certainty equivalent is 
close to the highest possible outcome. When evaluating such lotteries, an individual cannot make 
a large positive error, which would result in lottery being chosen over its highest outcome for 
certain. Thus, a lot of positive errors are immediately discarded as transparent mistakes but many 
negative errors are not recognized as obvious mistakes. Random errors are then likely to decrease 
the true expected utility of a lottery. This increases the chances of observing risk averse behavior 
for all individuals. For improbable gains or probable losses the situation is exactly reversed. 
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B. Discrepancy between certainty equivalent and probability 
equivalent elicitation methods 
Certainty equivalent and probability equivalent elicitation methods are two classical 
procedures for inferring von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of an individual from the 
observed binary choices. Unfortunately, two methods yield systematically different results (e.g. 
Wakker and Deneffe, 1996). Consider a simple lottery ( )21,;21, 21 xxL  and let c  be a minimum 
outcome that an individual is willing to accept in exchange for L . Furthermore, let p  be the 
highest probability such that an individual is willing to accept outcome c  for certain in exchange 
for lottery ( )pxpxL ,;1, 21 −′ . Obviously, any deterministic decision theory predicts that 21=p . 
Hershey and Schoemaker (1985) find instead that individuals, who initially reveal ( ) 221 xxc +> , 
often also declare 21>p  one week later (both for positive and negative outcomes).5   
Outcome c  is a minimum outcome which can be chosen over lottery L  and it is simply a 
perceived certainty equivalent of L  (see footnote 2). Thus, c  is a random variable distributed in 
the interval [ ]21 , xx  with median LM . Probability p  is defined so that an individual chooses 
outcome c  for certain over lottery ( )pxpxL ,;1, 21 −′  but not over lottery ( )εε +−−′′ pxpxL ,;1, 21  
where 0>ε  is arbitrary small. An individual reveals probability equivalent p  with probability 
( )( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]LLLLLLLL cuFcuFcuFcuF ′′′′′′′′′′ −−⋅−≅−−⋅− µµµµ 11 . Probability equivalent that 
is most likely to be revealed is characterized by ( )( ) 21=− ′′ LL cuF µ  or, equivalently, cM L =′ . 
If an individual has a linear utility function, then the certainty equivalent LCE  of lottery 
L  is simply ( ) 221 xx + . Assumption 2 then implies that =LM ( ) 221 xx +  i.e. the perceived 
certainty equivalent c  is symmetrically distributed in the interval [ ]21 , xx . If the realization of c  
is above ( ) 221 xx + , then an individual is most likely to reveal probability equivalent p  such 
                                                 
5 Figures 1a and 1c in Hershey and  Schoemaker (1985) also demonstrate that individuals, who initially reveal ( ) 221 xxc +< , are slightly more likely to declare 21<p  one week later. 
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that >=′ cM L ( ) 221 xx + . This probability equivalent p  must be greater than one half because 
if 21=p  then ( ) 221 xxMM LL +==′ . This conclusion also holds for an individual with a 
concave or a convex utility function if ( ) 221 xxM L +≤ . 
Intuitively, discrepancy between certainty equivalent and probability equivalent methods 
occurs due to error propagation. An individual makes random mistakes when evaluating a risky 
lottery so that the perceived certainty equivalent of the latter is equally likely to be below or 
above certain outcome LM . For a risk neutral individual, outcome LM  is simply the midpoint of 
the interval [ ]21 , xx . Consider an individual who accidentally reveals too high perceived certainty 
equivalent LMc >>  for a risky lottery and subsequently searches for a probability equivalent of 
this high outcome c . This individual is most likely to associate the sure outcome c  with a lottery 
whose perceived certainty equivalent is equally probable to be below or above c . The 
probability of the highest outcome in such lottery is higher than one half. If it were exactly one 
half, the lottery would coincide with the original risky lottery whose certainty equivalent is 
equally likely to be below or above outcome LM , but we know that LMc >> .  
Thus, conditional on high realization of a certainty equivalent, the probability equivalent 
elicited in the second stage is likely to be high as well. Similarly, conditional on low realization 
of a certainty equivalent, it is most likely that the probability equivalent elicited in the second 
stage is low as well. The argument also works when the sequence of tasks is reversed. Consider 
an individual who reveals a probability equivalent p  for outcome ( ) 221 xx +  and then reports 
the certainty equivalent for lottery ( )pxpxL ,;1, 21 −′ . He or she is most likely to deduce p  from 
a lottery whose perceived certainty equivalent is equally likely to be below or above ( ) 221 xx + . 
If, by mistake, the revealed probability equivalent is too high, the perceived certainty equivalent 
of lottery L′  is more likely to be above ( ) 221 xx +  (e.g. Hershey and  Schoemaker, 1985).  
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C. The preference reversal phenomenon 
The preference reversal phenomenon is a common violation of procedure invariance6 that 
is often observed in the experimental studies. The phenomenon involves two lotteries of similar 
expected value. Lottery R  yields a relatively high outcome with a low probability and it is often 
referred to as a dollar-bet. Lottery S  yields a modest outcome with a probability close to one and 
it is typically called a probability-bet. Many individuals choose S  over R  in a direct binary 
choice, but at the same time they reveal that their lowest selling price is higher for R  than for S . 
For instance, Tversky et al. (1990) find that 83% of subjects choose ( )97.0,4;$03.0,0$S  over 
( )31.0,16;$69.0,0$R  and 71% of them price lottery R  above lottery S . 
Binary choice between lotteries R  and S  is a choice between two risky lotteries, which 
is the subject of the next section. However, lottery S  delivers one outcome with probability 
close to one. Random errors do not distort the evaluation of degenerate lotteries as a consequence 
of Assumption 1. For simplicity, we assume that lottery S , which resembles a degenerate lottery, 
is also unaffected by random errors. Bostic et al. (1990) provide empirical support for such 
assumption. They find “only negligible differences” between a stated price for S  and a certainty 
equivalent of S  elicited from a series of binary choices between a risky and a degenerate lottery.  
In a direct binary choice, an individual chooses probability-bet S  over dollar-bet R  if 
( )RUS ≥µ . Therefore, the likelihood that an individual chooses S  over R  is ( )RSRF µµ − . An 
individual is more (or equally) likely to choose a probability-bet over a dollar-bet if RS MCE ≥ .7 
The lowest selling price for lottery S  is, naturally, just its certainty equivalent SCE  (e.g. Bostic 
et al., 1990). However, the theory of binary choice between a degenerate and a risky lottery that 
                                                 
6 According to the principle of procedure invariance, equivalent methods of eliciting unobserved individual 
preference should yields identical results. 
7 If an individual makes no mistakes in the evaluation of a probability-bet, the perceived certainty equivalent of S  is 
simply its certainty equivalent SCE  according to deterministic individual preferences. 
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we developed so far does not offer an immediate interpretation for the price of a risky lottery. 
One interpretation might be that the revealed price for a dollar-bet is an outcome that is perceived 
as equivalent in terms of utility to the average perceived expected utility of a risky lottery R . 
By definition, dollar-bet yields a relatively high outcome with a low probability. Thus, 
for all individuals, who are not extremely risk-seeking, the certainty equivalent RCE  is located 
closer to the lowest possible outcome of lottery R . We established already in subsection A that 
for such lotteries the median RM  of the distribution of the perceived expected utility is greater or 
equal to RCE . If the modal error that an individual makes when evaluating a risky lottery is zero, 
RCE  is the mode of the distribution of the perceived expected utility. A famous “mode, median, 
mean inequality” (e.g. Groeneveld and Meeden, 1977) then implies that the mean of the 
distribution of the perceived expected utility of R  is greater or equal to the median RM . 
Therefore, it is possible to construct lotteries R  and S  such that the certainty equivalent 
SCE  is at least as high as the median RM  and not greater than the mean of the distribution of the 
perceived expected utility of R . In this case, an individual is more (or equally) likely to choose 
S  over R  in a direct binary choice while revealing a minimum selling price for R , which is 
greater or equal to the minimum selling price for S . Intuitively, such preference reversal 
phenomenon occurs because an individual makes larger errors (that are likely to cause an 
overvaluation of a dollar bet) in a pricing task than in a binary choice task. 
Interestingly, one can also construct lotteries R′  and S ′  such that the certainty equivalent 
SCE ′  is at least as high as the mean and not greater than the median RM ′  of the distribution of 
the perceived expected utility of R′ .8  In this case, stochastic decision theory predicts that one 
may observe a high incidence of reverse preference reversals (choice of R′  over S ′  but a higher 
revealed price for S ′ ). This implication can be further tested in the laboratory. 
                                                 
8 S ′  delivers high outcome with probability close to one and R′  yields even higher outcome with large probability. 
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III. Binary choice between two risky lotteries 
A simple stochastic decision theory presented in section II can be easily extended to a 
more general case when an individual chooses between two risky lotteries. An individual chooses 
lottery L  over lottery L′ if the perceived expected utility LL ξµ +  of L  is at least as high as the 
perceived expected utility LL ′′ + ξµ  of L′ . Let LLLL ′′ −= ξξξ ,  be the difference in random errors 
that distort the evaluation of lotteries L  and L′ . An individual then chooses L  over L′  if 
(3) LLLL ′′ ≥+ µξµ ,    
Lottery L  is always chosen over lottery L′  if condition (3) holds with strict inequality. 
Inequality (3) defines the same choice rule as in the Fechner error model (e.g. Hey and 
Orme, 1994). However, the decision theory presented here differs from the Fechner model in the 
assumptions that are made about the distribution of an error term. In the Fechner model, an error 
term is symmetrically distributed. This is not necessarily the case for a random error LL ′,ξ .  
Proposition 1 If Assumption 1 holds, then ( ) ( )( ) 0, =−+−≤ ′′ LLLL yuxuprob µµξ  for all 
xx < , yy > , and ( ) ( )( ) 1, =−+−≤ ′′ LLLL yuxuprob µµξ  for all xx > , yy < , where x  and x  
( y  and y ) are the lowest possible and the highest possible outcome of lottery L  (lottery L′ ).  
All proofs are presented in the appendix 
Intuitively, the difference in perceived expected utility of lotteries L  and L′  cannot be 
smaller than the difference between the utility of the lowest possible outcome of L  and the 
utility of the highest possible outcome of L′ . Similarly, an individual cannot perceive the 
difference in expected utilities of lotteries L  and L′  to be greater than the difference between 
the utility of the highest possible outcome of L  and the utility of the lowest possible outcome of 
L′ . Proposition 1 immediately implies that an individual always chooses L  over L′  if the 
highest possible outcome of L′  is smaller than the lowest possible outcome of L  and vice versa.  
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According to Proposition 1, any realization of a random error LL ′,ξ , which is lower than 
( ) ( ) LLyuxu µµ −+− ′  or greater than ( ) ( ) LLyuxu µµ −+− ′ , is immediately recognized and dis-
missed as a transparent mistake. The set of large negative errors ( ) ( ){ }LLLLLL yuxu µµξξ −+−< ′′′ ,,  
and the set of large positive errors ( ) ( ){ }LLLLLL yuxu µµξξ −+−> ′′′ ,,  may not be symmetric 
around zero. Therefore, the distribution of error LL ′,ξ  is not necessarily symmetric. In section II 
we additionally assumed that small random errors are nevertheless symmetrically distributed 
around zero on the outcome scale (Assumption 2). In the context of binary choice between two 
risky lotteries it is more convenient to assume that small random errors LL ′,ξ  are symmetrically 
distributed around zero on the utility scale. Thus, Assumption 2 is replaced with Assumption 2a. 
Assumption 2a ( ) ( )εξξε ≤≤=≤≤− ′′ LLLL probprob ,, 00  for any 0>ε  and any lotteries 
L  and L′  such that ( ) ( ) LLyuxu µµε −+−≤ ′  and ( ) ( ) µµε −+−≥− ′Lyuxu . 
Assumption 1 implies that there is no error in choice between degenerate lotteries. If an 
individual makes no errors when choosing between 20 dollars for sure and 10 dollars for sure, it 
is plausible to assume that the chance of mistake is negligible when these outcomes are delivered 
with high probability (e.g. 0.999) but not for certain. In choice between such “almost sure things”, 
the dispersion of random errors can be expected to become progressively narrower, the closer are 
risky lotteries to the degenerate lotteries. This intuition is embedded in the following assumption. 
Assumption 3 ( ) 0lim , =≥′∞→ εξ kk LLk prob  for any 0>ε  and any sequence of risky lotteries 
( ){ }∞=111 ,;..., kknnkk pxpxL  and ( ){ }∞=′ 111 ,;..., kknnkk qxqxL  such that 1⎯⎯ →⎯ ∞→kkip  and 1⎯⎯ →⎯ ∞→kkjq  for 
some { }nji ,...,1, ∈ .  
The remainder of this section shows how choice rule (3) together with Assumptions 1, 2a 
and 3 explains well-known empirical phenomena in binary choice between two risky lotteries. 
 15
A. The generalized common consequence effect (the Allais paradox) 
The common consequence effect involves four lotteries ( )1,2xS , ( )qxpxqpxR ,;1,;, 321 −− , 
( )pxpxS ,;1, 21 −′  and ( )qxqxR ,;1, 31 −′  with probabilities 10 <<<< pq . These lotteries are 
constructed so that the difference in expected utility between S  and R  is the same as between 
S ′  and R′  i.e. RSRS ′′ −=− µµµµ . Expected utility theory predicts that if an individual chooses 
S  over R  then he or she should also choose S ′  over R′  and vise versa (unless the individual is 
exactly indifferent between S  and R  and between S ′  and R′ ). However, empirical evidence 
shows that individuals often choose S  over R  and at the same time they choose R′  over S ′  (e.g. 
Slovic and Tversky, 1974; MacCrimmon and Larsson, 1979). This choice pattern is known as the 
common consequence effect. The most famous example of this effect is the Allais paradox (e.g. 
Allais, 1953), which is a special case when 11.0,105$,10$,0$ 63
6
21 =⋅=== pxxx  and 1.0=q . 
Proposition 2 For any two lotteries L  and L′  that have equal expected utility ( LL ′= µµ ), 
an individual chooses L  at least as often as L′  if ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )xuyuyuxu −>−  and an individual 
chooses L′  at least as often as L  if ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )yuxuxuyu −>− , given Assumptions 1 and 2a. 
According to Proposition 2, in binary choice between S  and R  that have equal expected 
utility, an individual chooses S  more (or equally) often as R  if ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2312 xuxuxuxu −>−  or, 
equivalently, ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 2132 xuxuxu +> . If lotteries S  and R  have equal expected utility, then S ′  
and R′  have also equal expected utility. Thus, according to Proposition 2, an individual chooses 
R′  at least as often as S ′  if ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1213 xuxuxuxu −>− , which is always satisfied. Thus, when 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 2132 xuxuxu +>  and lotteries S  and R  have the same expected utility, an individual can 
choose S  more often than R  and at the same time he or she can choose R′  more often than S ′ . 
This conclusion is immediately extendable to lotteries S  and R  that have similar (but not equal) 
 16
expected utility, if we assume that errors SR,ξ  can realize with strictly positive probability in any 
interval within the bounds of their admissible values, which are defined in Proposition 1. 
The intuition behind common consequence effect is the following. A degenerate lottery S  
is not affected by random errors but the evaluation of a risky lottery R  is affected by errors. The 
random errors are likely to decrease the perceived expected utility of R  if its certainty equivalent 
is closer to its highest possible outcome 3x  (see section II).
9 Thus, an individual can choose S  
more often because random errors decrease the attractiveness of R . In a binary choice between 
S ′  and R′ , random errors are likely to overvalue the perceived expected utility of both lotteries. 
This effect is stronger for lottery R′  because it has a wider range of possible outcomes.10 Thus, 
an individual can choose R′  more often than S ′  because random errors increase the perceived 
advantage of R′  over S ′ . 
According to the above explanation, the incidence of the common consequence effect 
diminishes if S  becomes a risky lottery with the same range of possible outcomes as R , and S ′  
has the same range of possible outcomes as R′ . In this case, random errors are likely to decrease 
(increase) the perceived expected utility of S  and R  ( S ′  and R′ ), and the strength of this effect 
is similar for both lotteries. Conlisk (1989) and Camerer (1992) find experimental evidence 
confirming this prediction: when four lotteries employed in the common consequence effect are 
all located inside the probability triangle (e.g. Marschak, 1950; Machina, 1982), the common 
consequence effect largely disappears. 
                                                 
9 If lotteries S  and R  have equal expected utilities, then the certainty equivalent of R  is simply 2x . Thus, we end 
up with a condition that 2x  is closer to the highest possible outcome 3x  than to the lowest possible outcome 1x  of 
lottery R . If we use Assumption 2a instead of Assumption 2, we have a condition that ( )2xu  is closer to ( )3xu  
than to ( )1xu , which is equivalent to ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 2132 xuxuxu +> . 
10 Lotteries S ′  and R′  are constructed so that the highest possible outcome of R′  is greater than that of S ′  (both 
lotteries have the same lowest possible outcome 1x ). If lotteries S ′  and R′  have identical expected utility, random 
errors SR ′′,ξ  are more likely to be positive rather than negative as a result of Proposition 1 and Assumption 2a. 
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B. The common ratio effect 
The common ratio effect involves a binary choice between lottery ( )1,2xS  and lottery 
( )θθ ,;1, 31 xxR −  and a binary choice between lottery ( )rxrxS ,;1, 21 −′  and lottery ( )rxrxR ⋅⋅−′ θθ ,;1, 31  
with probabilities 10 <<<< θr . Four lotteries are constructed so that ( )RSRS r µµµµ −=− ′′ . 
Therefore, expected utility theory predicts that if an individual chooses S  over R , then he or she 
should also choose S ′  over R′  (unless he or she is exactly indifferent in both choice situations). 
The common ratio effect refers to the empirical finding that individuals often choose S  over R  
and at the same time they choose R′  over S ′  (e.g. Bernasconi, 1994; Loomes and Sugden, 1998). 
 We already established that an individual may choose a degenerate lottery S  more often 
than a risky lottery R  if both lotteries are sufficiently similar in expected utility; random errors 
can realize in any interval within admissible bounds; and ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 2132 xuxuxu +> . Intuitively, 
lottery S  can be chosen more frequently, even if it has a lower utility, because random errors do 
not distort the utility of S  but they are likely to decrease the perceived expected utility of R . 
When probability 0→r , then both lottery S ′  and lottery R′  converge to a degenerate 
lottery that yields outcome 1x  for certain. Lottery R′  has a higher expected utility than lottery S ′  
if ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2311 xuxuxu >⋅+⋅− θθ . In this case ( ) 0lim ,0 =−≥ ′′′′→ SRRSr prob µµξ  according to 
Assumption 3. Thus, it is possible to find probability r , which is close enough to zero, so that an 
individual chooses lottery S ′  with arbitrary small probability.  
Intuitively, for small r , lottery R′  may be chosen with very high probability because the 
distorting effect of random errors diminishes when lotteries S ′  and R′  converge to a degenerate 
lottery. In such case, the chances are high that an individual simply chooses the lottery with a 
higher expected utility, which can be lottery R′ . Thus, we can explain not only the common ratio 
effect but also a modal choice of R′  over S ′  frequently found in the data (e.g. Loomes, 2005).  
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C. The violations of the betweenness 
Consider two risky lotteries S  and R , none of which dominates the other. A risky lottery 
( )RSM αα −+= 1 , ( )1,0∈α  is a probability mixture of S  and R . When an individual chooses 
S  over R  and at the same time chooses M  over S , he or she reveals quasi-concave preferences 
or preference for randomization (e.g. Starmer, 2000). When an individual chooses R  over S  and 
at the same time chooses S  over M , the individual reveals quasi-convex preferences or aversion 
to randomization (e.g. Starmer, 2000). There exist lotteries S  and R  such that individuals reveal 
quasi-concave preferences more often than quasi-convex preferences and vice versa (e.g. Prelec, 
1990; Gigliotti and Sopher, 1993). This finding is known as the violations of the betweenness.11 
Since M  is a probability mixture of S  and R , its expected utility is ( ) RSM µααµµ −+= 1 . 
According to the choice rule (3), the likelihood of observing quasi-concave preferences is simply 
( ) ( )( )( )RSSMRSSR probprob µµαξµµξ −−≥⋅−≤ 1,,  and the chances of observing quasi-convex 
preferences are ( ) ( )( )( )RSSMRSSR probprob µµαξµµξ −−≤⋅−≥ 1,, . Thus, an individual reveals 
quasi-concave preferences more often if ( ) ( )( )( )RSSMRSSR probprob µµαξµµξ −−≤≥−≤ 1,,  
and ( )( )( ) ( )RSSRRSSM probprob µµξµµαξ −≥≥−−≥ ,, 1 . In the simplest case when errors SR,ξ  
and SM ,ξ  are identically distributed, these inequalities always hold when 1<α  and RS µµ > . 
Similarly, an individual reveals quasi-convex preferences more often if RS µµ < .  
Intuitively, when S  has a higher expected utility than R , random errors are more likely 
to reverse the choice of S  over M  than the choice of S  over R  because M  is located between 
S  and R  in terms of expected utility. For example, “intermediate” errors higher than MS µµ −  
and lower than RS µµ −  would result in the choice of M  over S , but they do not reverse the 
choice of S  over R . Such random errors cause a higher incidence of quasi-concave preferences. 
                                                 
11 The betweenness axiom is a weaker version of the independence axiom and it states that if an individual is 
indifferent between two lotteries, then a probability mixture of these lotteries is equally good (e.g. Dekel, 1986).  
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IV. Reexamination of experimental data 
A. Parametric cumulative distribution function of random errors 
Having demonstrated that the choice rule (3) together with Assumptions 1, 2a and 3 can 
theoretically explain many well-known violations of expected utility theory, the next obvious step 
is to estimate this stochastic decision theory on experimental data and compare its fit with other 
prominent decision theories. Direct non-parametric estimation of the distribution of an error LL ′,ξ  
for a pair of lotteries L  and L′  appears to be problematic, because the experimenter cannot ask 
the subjects to choose between L  and L′  many times within a short period. Thus, for empirical 
estimation, we need to assume a parametric cumulative distribution function of random errors.  
A natural candidate is that random errors are drawn from a normal distribution (e.g. Hey 
and Orme, 1994). However, normal distribution does not satisfy Assumptions 1 and 3. Moreover, 
Ballinger and Wilcox (1997) find that the normal distribution is “soundly rejected” by their data. 
Last but not least, normally distributed random errors may induce a high likelihood of violations 
of transparent stochastic dominance (e.g. Loomes and Sugden, 1998). To address these problems, 
the normal cumulative distribution function is used with the following modifications. 
To satisfy Assumption 1, random errors are drawn from a truncated normal distribution. 
Specifically, lottery L  is chosen over lottery L′  with probability 
(4) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )LLLL LLLLLLLL yuxuyuxu
yuxu
prob µµµµ
µµµµµµξ −+−Φ−−+−Φ
−Φ−−+−Φ=−≥
′′
′′
′′,  
where x  and x  ( y  and y ) are the lowest and the highest possible outcome of lottery L  (lottery 
L′ ) and ( ).Φ  is cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution with zero mean and a 
standard deviation ',LLσ . Obviously, equation (4) satisfies both Proposition 1 and Assumption 2a.  
When an individual chooses between two risky lotteries and one lottery transparently 
dominates the other, the individual almost always chooses the dominant alternative. For instance, 
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Carbone and Hey (1995) find only one violation of transparent dominance in 320 decisions (rate 
of violation 0.3%). Loomes and Sugden (1998) discover 12 violations of transparent dominance 
in 920 choice decisions (rate of violation 1.3%). Hey (2001) reports 24 violations of transparent 
dominance in 1590 choice decisions (rate of violation 1.5%). This empirical evidence suggests 
that the variance of errors 2 ',LLσ  is quite small when one lottery clearly dominates the other.  
The notion of “transparent dominance” is not clearly defined in the literature. Intuitively, 
one lottery transparently dominates the other if it yields small outcomes with lower probability 
and large outcomes with higher probability. Apparently, transparent dominance is not equivalent 
to the first-order stochastic dominance. Tversky and Kahneman (1986) and Birnbaum (2004) 
provide experimental evidence that the first-order stochastic dominance can be frequently 
violated (with rates of violation up to 80%). Transparent dominance as defined in Definition 1 is 
equivalent to the first-order stochastic dominance if 3=n  but it is a stronger relation if 4≥n .12 
Definition 1 Lottery ( )nn pxpxL ,;..., 11  transparently dominates lottery ( )nn qxqxL ,;..., 11′  
if there exist { }ni ,...,1∈  such that jj qp ≤  for all { }ij ,...,1∈  and jj qp ≥  for all { }nij ,...,1+∈ . 
If lottery L  transparently dominates lottery L′  or vice versa, a standard deviation ',LLσ  is 
equal to a constant Dσ , which is likely to be (close to) zero for many individuals. When neither 
lottery transparently dominates the other, standard deviation ',LLσ  is not necessarily small though 
it converges to zero if lotteries L  and L′  converge to degenerate lotteries (in order to satisfy 
Assumption 3). All these properties can be captured by the following formula:  
(5)  ( ) ( )⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+−⋅
′
= ∏ ∏
= =
otherwise,11
 versaor vice , dominatesently   transpar,
1 1
',
n
i
n
i
ii
D
LL qp
LLσ
σσ  
                                                 
12 Tversky and Kahneman (1986) and Birnbaum (2004) find frequent violations of the first-order stochastic 
dominance (when it is not transparent dominance) using lotteries with 4=n  and 5=n ; whereas Carbone and 
Hey (1995), Loomes and Sugden (1998) and Hey (2001) find only few violations using lotteries with 3=n . 
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where σ  and σσ <<D  are individual specific parameters and ip  ( iq ) is the probability of 
outcome ix  in lottery L  (lottery L′ ), { }ni ,...,1∈ . Equations (4) and (5) complete the description 
of a parametric form of stochastic decision theory, which adds only two additional parameters 
(σ  and Dσ ) compared to the expected utility theory. Obviously, the expected utility theory is a 
special (limiting) case of the stochastic decision theory (4)-(5) when parameters σ  and Dσ  both 
converge to zero. In this case, probability (5) that an individual chooses lottery L  over lottery L′  
converges to one if LL ′> µµ  and it converges to zero when LL µµ >′ . 
B. Experimental data and estimation procedure 
Stochastic decision theory (4)-(5) is estimated on experimental data of Hey and Orme 
(1994) and Loomes and Sugden (1998).13 These datasets were already extensively reexamined 
for estimating various models of stochastic choice because they contain a sufficiently large 
number of observations per subject.14 In the experiment of Hey and Orme (1994), 80 subjects are 
presented with 100 binary choice questions involving lotteries with outcomes £0, £10, £20 and 
£30. In every question, none of the lotteries transparently dominates the other alternative. At least 
three days after the initial experiment, the subjects repeat all 100 choice decisions again in a 
different randomized order. In the experiment of Loomes and Sugden (1998), 92 individuals face 
45 binary choice questions involving lotteries with outcomes £0, £10 and either £20 or £30. Five 
questions are constructed so that one lottery transparently dominates the other lottery. Each of 45 
questions is repeated two times within one experimental session.  
The estimation of stochastic decision theory is conducted separately for every individual. 
Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function ( ).u  can be normalized for two arbitrary outcomes 
                                                 
13 John Hey generously provided the data from Hey and Orme (1994). The data from Loomes and Sugden (1998) are 
reprinted in full detail in Loomes et al. (2002). 
14 Hey (1995), Hey and Carbone (1995), Carbone and Hey (2000), Buschena and Zilberman (2000) reexamined the 
data of Hey and Orme (1994). Loomes et al. (2002) reexamined the data of Loomes and Sugden (1998). 
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and normalization ( ) 00£ =u  and ( ) 110£ =u  is chosen for every subject in both datasets. Thus, 
every individual from Hey and Orme (1994) study is characterized by a triple of parameters 
( ) ( ){ }30£,20£, uuσ  and every subject from Loomes and Sugden (1998) study is characterized by 
a triple of parameters ( ){ }20£,, uDσσ  or ( ){ }30£,, uDσσ . These individual specific parameters 
are estimated by maximizing log-likelihood function15 
(6) 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )
( ) ( )[ ]( ) ( )∑= ′′′′
′′′′
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⋅−≥−+−≥
+⋅−≥−+⋅−≥
=
N
j jLLLLLLLL
jLLLLjLLLL
cIprobprob
cIprobcIprob
LL
JjjjJjjj
JjjjJjjj
1 2,,
3,1,
1lnln
2
1
1lnln
µµξµµξ
µµξµµξ
 
where 1=jc  if an individual chooses lottery jL  over lottery jL′ , 2=jc  if an individual declares 
that he or she does not care which lottery jL  or jL′  to choose, and 3=jc  if an individual chooses 
jL′  over jL  in question { }Nj ,...,1∈ ; ( ).xI  is an indicator function, and the number of questions 
N  is 200 for Hey and Orme (1994) and 90 for Loomes and Sugden (1998) dataset. Probability 
( )
Jjjj LLLL
prob µµξ −≥ ′′,  is calculated according to formula (4) with standard deviation (5). 
For every subject in both datasets, the fit of stochastic decision theory is compared with 
the fit of rank-dependent expected utility theory, or RDEU, (e.g. Quiggin, 1981) which coincides 
with cumulative prospect theory (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), when lotteries involve only 
positive outcomes. Loomes et al. (2002) argue that RDEU is a good representative non-expected 
utility theory for contesting against stochastic models based on the expected utility theory. The 
estimates of RDEU parameters are obtained by maximizing log-likelihood function (6) given that 
( )
Jjjj LLLL
prob µµξ −≥ ′′, ( )RDEULRDEUL jj µµ −Φ−= ′1 , where ( ).Φ  is a cumulative distribution function 
of the normal distribution with zero mean and constant standard deviation s  (estimated separately 
for every individual), and RDEULµ  is utility of lottery L  according to RDEU (e.g. Quiggin, 1981).16  
                                                 
15 Non-linear optimization was implemented in the Matlab 6.5 package (based on the Nelder-Mead simplex 
algorithm). The program files are available from the author on request. 
16 Normalization ( ) 00£ =u  and ( ) 110£ =u  is used for RDEU in both datasets.  
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C. Results 
Table 1 shows mean, median and standard deviation of the estimated parameters of the 
stochastic decision theory and RDEU across all subjects in Hey and Orme (1994) dataset and 
Loomes and Sugden (1998) dataset.17 Notably, the estimates of “noise” parameters σ  and Dσ  in 
stochastic decision theory and the standard deviation s  in RDEU embedded into the Fechner 
error model are relatively low. Thus, although individuals make stochastic choices, there appears 
to be strong consistency in their decisions (e.g. Hey, 2001). Table 2 shows that an overwhelming 
majority of subjects have concave utility function but in Loomes and Sugden (1998) dataset 
nearly every second subject has an S-shaped probability weighting function, which contradicts to 
the theoretical foundations of RDEU (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). 
Stochastic decision theory presented in this paper and RDEU embedded in the Fechner 
error model are non-nested models that can be compared by means of Vuong’s likelihood ratio 
test (e.g. Vuong, 1989).18 Vuong’s statistic z has a limiting standard normal distribution if two 
theories make equally good predictions. A significant positive value of z indicates that stochastic 
decision theory explains better the choice decisions of an individual and a significant negative 
value—that RDEU embedded in a simple Fechner error model makes a more accurate prediction.   
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the distribution of Vuong’s likelihood ratio statistic across all 
subjects in Hey and Orme (1994) dataset and Loomes and Sugden (1998) dataset.19 In Hey and 
Orme (1994) dataset RDEU has more parameters than the stochastic decision theory (because 
there are no questions with transparent dominance). Therefore, Vuong’s likelihood ratio statistic 
                                                 
17 In Loomes and Sugden (1998) dataset, half of the subjects faced lotteries with outcome £20 and half of the 
subjects faced lotteries with outcome £30. Therefore, aggregate statistics for parameters ( )20£u  and ( )30£u  in 
Loomes and Sugden (1998) dataset are calculated using only half of the sample. 
18 Loomes et al. (2002, p.128) describe the application of Vuong’s non-nested likelihood ratio test to the selection 
between different stochastic choice models. 
19 Six subjects in Loomes and Sugden (1998) dataset turned out to be perfect expected utility maximizes. Since the 
expected utility theory is a special case of both stochastic decision theory ( 0, →Dσσ ) and RDEU ( 0,1 →= sγ ), 
Vuong’s likelihood ratio cannot be calculated in this case. Thus, these six subjects were excluded from Figure 2. 
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in Figure 1 is adjusted using Akaike and Schwarz information criteria. Figure 1 and Figure 2 
show that for the majority of individuals the prediction of new stochastic decision theory is not 
significantly different from the prediction of RDEU embedded into Fechner model. Additionally, 
there appears to be more individuals (especially in Loomes and Sugden (1998) dataset) whose 
choice decisions are better predicted by stochastic decision theory rather than RDEU embedded 
into Fechner model. These results are consistent with conclusions of Buschena and Zilberman 
(2000) who reexamined Hey and Orme (1994) dataset. They find that the expected utility theory 
embedded into a stochastic choice model with heteroscedastic error performs at least as good as 
non-expected utility theories embedded into choice models with homoscedastic errors. 
Parameters Hey and Orme (1994) dataset Loomes and Sugden (1998) dataset 
Stochastic 
decision theory Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation ( )20£u  1.276 1.204 0.239 1.270 1.234 0.241 
( )30£u  1.586 1.398 0.608 1.484 1.455 0.367 
σ  0.081 0.038 0.230 0.074 0.053 0.101 
Dσ     0.007 0.000 0.022 
RDEU       
( )20£u  1.322 1.279 0.240 1.304 1.291 0.239 
( )30£u  1.641 1.527 0.500 1.727 1.533 1.172 
γ 20 0.944 0.898 0.256 0.961 0.985 0.218 
s  0.083 0.067 0.052 0.104 0.076 0.130 
Table 1 Maximum likelihood estimates of parameters of stochastic decision theory and 
RDEU (given normalization ( ) 00£ =u  and ( ) 110£ =u ) 
Hey and Orme (1994) Loomes and Sugden (1998) 
Property Stochastic 
decision theory RDEU 
Stochastic 
decision theory RDEU 
Convex utility function 2 1 1 2 
S-shaped probability 
weighting function  19  44 
Table 2 Number of subjects for whom the maximum likelihood estimates of parameters of 
stochastic decision theory and RDEU satisfy convexity/concavity properties
                                                 
20 Parameter γ  is a power coefficient of the probability weighting function ( ) ( )( ) γγγγ 11 ppppw −+= . 
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Figure 1 Comparison of stochastic decision theory vs. RDEU for subjects in Hey and Orme (1994) experiment 
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Figure 2 Comparison of stochastic decision theory vs. RDEU for subjects in Loomes and Sugden (1998) experiment
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V. Conclusion 
A vast experimental literature shows that individuals often make inconsistent decisions 
in a repeated choice under risk even when they are allowed to express indifference and the same 
binary choice problem is repeated within a short period of time. Variation in individual decisions 
appears to be nonsystematic, which supports the interpretation that stochastic choice under risk is 
a result of random mistakes rather than a reflection of stochastic preferences (random utility). In 
the existing models of stochastic choice, random errors are typically modeled as symmetrically 
distributed around zero so that an individual does not make systematic mistakes. 
In this paper, a decision maker is modeled as an individual who maximizes his or her 
expected utility but makes random errors when evaluating a risky lottery. However, an individual 
does not make transparent and obvious mistakes. For example, an individual never chooses a 
risky lottery over its highest possible outcome for certain (or the lowest possible outcome for 
sure over a risky lottery). Thus, a minimum degree of rationality is imposed on the behavior of 
an individual who is allowed to make random errors as long as they do not lead to transparently 
irrational decisions. This restriction distinguishes the present paper from the numerous models of 
stochastic choice that were already proposed in the literature. 
   The main contribution of this paper is a demonstration that many well-known 
violations of expected utility theory (such as the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes, the common 
consequence effect, the violations of the betweenness etc.) can be the result of random errors. 
Several empirical phenomena analyzed in this paper were already explained by the existing error 
models. For example, Fechner error model can explain a more frequent choice of a riskier lottery 
in the common ratio effect but it cannot explain the switch to the modal choice of a riskier 
alternative. This switch is explained in this paper due to an assumption that the dispersion of 
random errors converges to zero when lotteries become similar to the degenerate lotteries. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1  
On the one hand, Assumption 1 implies ( )( ) 0=−≤ LL xuprob µξ , for all xx < , and 
( )( ) 1=−≤ ′′ LL yuprob µξ , for all yy > . Since ( ) 0≤−+ ′′ yuLL ξµ  for any realization of L′ξ  and 
any yy >  we can write ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )≤−++−≤=−+−≤ ′′′′ yuxuprobyuxuprob LLLLLLLL ξµµξµµξ ,  
( )( ) 0=−≤≤ LL xuprob µξ . Thus, ( ) ( )( ) 0, =−+−≤ ′′ LLLL yuxuprob µµξ  for all xx <  and yy > .   
On the other hand, Assumption 1 implies that ( )( ) 1=−≤ LL xuprob µξ , for all xx > , and 
( )( ) 0=−≤ ′′ LL yuprob µξ  or ( )( ) 1=−> ′′ LL yuprob µξ , for all yy < . Since ( )xuLL −+ξµ  is 
always smaller or equal to zero for any realization of Lξ  and any xx > , it is possible to write 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )≥−≥≥−++−≥=−+−≤ ′′′′′′ LLLLLLLLLL yuprobxuyuprobyuxuprob µξξµµξµµξ ,  
( )( ) 1=−>≥ ′′ LL yuprob µξ . ⇒  ( ) ( )( ) 1, =−+−≤ ′′ LLLL yuxuprob µµξ  for all yyxx <> , . Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 2 
According to a choice rule (3), if LL ′= µµ , then lottery L  is chosen over lottery L′  with 
probability ( )0, ≥′LLprob ξ  and L′  is chosen over L  with probability ( )0, ≤′LLprob ξ . In case 
when ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )xuyuyuxu −>− , we can write ( ) ( ) ( )( ) =−≤≤=≥ ′′ yuxuprobprob LLLL ,, 00 ξξ  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) =−≤≤≤−≤<−+−≤≤= ′′′ xuyuprobyuxuxuyuprobxuyuprob LLLLLL ,,, 00 ξξξ  
( ) ( )( ) ( )00 ,, ≤=≤≤−= ′′ LLLL probyuxuprob ξξ , with the first and last equality due to Proposition 1. 
Thus, L  is chosen at least as often as L′ . Similarly, when ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )yuxuxuyu −>− , one can 
write ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )+−<≤−=≤≤−=≤ ′′′ xuyuyuxuprobyuxuprobprob LLLLLL ,,, 00 ξξξ  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )=−≤≤=≤≤−≤≤≤−+ ′′′ yuxuprobxuyuprobxuyuprob LLLLLL ,,, 000 ξξξ  
( )0, ≥= ′LLprob ξ . In this case lottery L′  is chosen at least as often as lottery L . Q.E.D. 
